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7915 
Defendants' Brief 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to deter-
mine the validity of the actions taken by the Salt Lake 
County Commission, to date, to create a sewer district 
and acquire a sewer system. 
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rrhe Statement of Facts by the petitioners is not 
acceptable. Petitioners confuse the issues by reciting 
things which they fear might be done, rather than con-
fining themselves to the things which the County Com-
mission has in fact done. They becloud the issues before 
the court by detailed discussions that do not relate to 
the legality of the actions taken. Therefore, the following 
additional statement is necessary to a clear presentation 
of the County's position. 
At the outset, let it be noted that the County Com-
missioners are the duly elected representatives of the 
people. Certain powers and duties are conferred and 
imposed on them by law. There is no presumption that 
they are proceeding in violation of their duties and not 
every decision they make is subject to review by the 
courts. The validity of the statutes and proceedings 
under those statutes present the issues for determination. 
Matters of judgment placed by law in the Commission 
are not here material and a detailed discussion of such 
such matters only beclouds the issues. 
The first ordinance mentioned by petitioners is an 
ordinance adopted on May 18, 1942, prohibiting the use 
of privies, cesspools, etc., in areas where a sewer system 
is available. This ordinance was not adopted under the 
statutes in question, nor is it a pBrt of ::~nv of t.hP. sewer 
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proceedings. It preceded the first step in t Jw formation 
of a sPwer distriet by nearly fi,·l~ ypn rs. \Vh i lP WP 
included this 1942 ordinance in the record nt petitioners' 
insistence, and they have discussed it in some detail, 
we do not believe that it has anything to do with thP 
issues here involved. 
The first action of the County Commission relating 
to the creation of a sewer district was taken on Sep-
tember 9, 1946. On that date a resolution and order 
creating a district under Chapter 6(a) Title 19, were 
adopted. (See exhibits B and C.) Petitioners question 
the constitutionality of that statute, but there is appar-
ently no challenge made by petitioners concerning the 
sufficiency of the steps taken under the statute to create 
a district. No such an attack could be made successfully. 
The order and resolution show that the required signa-
tures were obtained and the required proceedings were 
followed, and the Legislature thereafter expressly vali-
dated all of the proceedings and any irregularities, if 
any there were, were cured by this validation act. (See 
Chapter 23b, Laws of Utah, 1947.) 
The next action was taken on March 18, 194 7. On 
that date three separate resolutions were adopted by 
the Commission. These three resolutions are bound to-
gether in the court files as Exhibit U. The first resolution 
adopted March 18, 1947, recites in its "whereas" clauses 
that the district had been created under Title 19, Chapter 
6 (a) on September 9, 1946, and that the commission de-
·3 
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sired to ratify the creation of that district and to fix its 
boundaries with more certainty. 
Petitioners erroneously refer to the resolutions of 
March 18th as "formally" creating the district. (Page 4, 
petitioners' brief) Petitioners then note that on April 5, 
1948, the County Commission rescinded ''the'' resolu-
tion of March 18, 194 7, (page 8, petitioners' brief) leav-
ing the erroneous impression that the orders and resolu-
tions creating the district were rescinded. We think it is 
important that the court bear in mind that only one of 
the three resolutions adopted on March 18, 1947, was 
rescinded. The other two (including the one ratifying 
the creation of the district) have never been questioned, 
and no attempt has ever been made to repeal or rescind 
them. 
Since neither this nor the proceedings of September 
9, 1946, were ever repealed or rescinded, the district has 
been valid and subsisting at all times since September 9, 
1946. The assertion by the petitioners that there was no 
district in existence at the time some of the subsequent 
contracts were entered into and other proceedings were 
taken is simply not correct. 
On page 5 of Exhibit U is the second ordinance of 
March 18, 1947, which in effect amended the 1942 sewer 
ordinance relating to the use of privies and cesspools 
where a sanitary sewer S-ystem was available. Then on 
page 8 of Exhibit U is the third resolution providing for 
the acquisition of a sewer system, and the issuance and 
sale of the bonds. Thereafter by t:h~nt~:~-r ?.~fh' Ll=lw~ 
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of Utah, 1947, the leg-islature validated a,ll of the pro-
ceeding-s theretofore taken. This validation act waH 
passed March 13, 1947, approved March 19, 1947, and 
became effective :May 13, 1947. 
A contract to sell the bonds for 31,4 per cent interest 
was entered into. (Ex. D) Engineers were employed. 
(Ex. E) Procedures were set up for the receiving of 
down payments on the system. (Ex. F) A trustee was 
selected and a citizens' advisory committee appointed. 
(Ex. G) The bonds were prepared for final printing, 
(Ex. K) and construction bids were received. (Ex. L) 
Signed applications for service were taken from 1510 
persons and approximately $85,000.00 was collected by 
way of down payments. (Ex. Land V, page 3) 
On April 5, 1948, the County Commission determined 
that it should reject all of the construction bids, because 
excessive, elected not to issue the bonds, and provided 
for the return of the approximately $85,000.00 to the 
applicants. The resolution adopted April5, 1948, (Ex. L) 
in express words rescinded the third resolution adopted 
by the Commission on March 18, 194 7. The action of the 
Commission to create the district, as taken on September 
9, 1946, and confirmed March 18, 1947, and validated by 
the legislature, was left undisturbed. 
On page 52 of petitioners' brief, they reiterate that 
the sewer district was abandoned. They admit on page 
52 that no attempt has ever been made to dissolve the 
district. Still much of the brief is devoted to the asser-
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tion that since the County Commission determined on 
April 5, 1948, that it would not proceed with construc-
tion and authorized the return of the monies collected, 
the district in some manner died, and the County Com-
mission lost all power ever to do anything further in the 
premises. Whether intentionally or not, petitioners care-
fully avoid a discussion, either in the Facts or in the 
Argument, as to how the district ''died'' or ceased to 
exist. There has never been any resolution adopted or 
other action taken by the County Commission to dis-
solve or abandon the district. All that was abandoned 
was the construction program of 1947 on which bids had 
been received and down payments had been accepted. 
When the Commission decided that it would not proceed 
with construction, it became necessary to permit the re-
turn of the down payment to the applicants. This was 
done, but the district was not dissolved and it remained 
to this day as a valid, subsisting district with the Board 
of County Commissioners its governing authority. 
Thus, in the spring of 1952, the district had full 
power to enter into any contracts germane to the acqui-
sition of a sewer, and had the power to present to the 
people a further project. This was done. A proposed 
plan was prepared and engineering was completed. 
Twenty thousand informational pamphlets were distribu-
ted. Twenty-eight mass meetings were held. A letter was 
mailed to every property owner within the district and 
paid advertisements were placed in all the Salt Lake 
newspapers. Nearly all of the people were heard from, 
either in the form of protests or apnlil'Ht-ion~ A~ 1~ ~Pt 
l 
I 
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forth in the answer of the County, in paragraph 12, there 
were less than 8700 existing structures in the district in 
the spring of 1952. Applications for service were received 
without protest from 6424 owners of these existing struc-
tures. An additional petition, containing 2645 signatures, 
(but not representing 2645 homes) was received and an 
additional 1210 applications were received for service 
to vacant lits. 1 It will be noted from the reply of the 
plaintiffs that these allegations are admitted. 
One of the main criticisms which was made of the 
19±7 project was that it was "cut and dried" before the 
people were told about it. The bonds had already been 
sold. The engineers had been employed, and the bond 
resolution had been adopted, before the project was 
presented to the people. It was the County's desire to 
present this project to the people in full before adopting 
a final bond resolution. Because no final resolution had 
been adopted when the Commission presented its tenta-
tive plan to the people and solicited applications, peti-
tioners say everything was illegal. They completely 
ignore the fact that the district itself still existed. With 
this district the Commission employed an engineer, fiscal 
agents and arranged for a depository. (Ex. 0, P, and Q) 
11t must also be borne in mind that while many of the 6424 appli-
cation cards were signed both by husband and wife, they were counted 
as a single application, because they were for service to a single 
structure. About 300 were for duplexes and apartments. These also 
were counted only as one. The 2600 protest signatures were just that 
and did not reflect 2600 structures. This is pointed up by the 
fact that the 6424 unprotested applications, the 390 protested applica-
tions, and the 2645 signature pr<?tests ~ot~l 9459. There . we!e only 
8603 existing structures of all kmds withm the . sev:er district. :ro 
this 9459 total must also be added the 1210 applications for service 
to vacant lots. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The district then presented to the people a detailed plan 
for the acquisition of a sewer. The people made various 
suggestions and objections. These were met (Ex. S) and 
then the people overwhelmingly (more than 75 per cent 
of the total) endorsed it in the form of signed applica-
tions for service. We seriously challenge the bald asser-
tion of petitioners in the Statement of Facts that they 
represent "thousands of people" in the county. 
The only other fact situation presented by the peti-
tioners on which we desire to comment is the manner of ·j 
signing for service. Petitioners assert that because of 
the ordinance making it a misdemeanor to use a cesspool, 
privy or septic tank where a sewer was available, all 
persons were coerced into signing up, and that the only 
manner in which they could sign up was to either give 
a lien on their property, or prepay eighteen months 
service. This is incorrect. 
Insofar as signing up for service was concerned, 
there were five methods available to any individual. First, 
the individual could pay his share in cash at the time he 
applied for service. Second, he could agree to pay his 
share in 24 equal monthly installments. Third, he could 
start out on a regular time basis and at any time within 
two years change his mind and pay off in full. Fourth, 
he could pay $50.00 down and $10.00 a month until he 
had paid $150.00. Thereafter, he would pay the monthly 
service charge of $3.00 per month until the project was 
paid for. If he used this time method of payment he 
could either, (a) agree that his unp81rl h~ll ;-~? ..:J~l!~~n""'+ 
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more than six months, could bl' recorded as n lien ag-n inst 
his property, or (b) he could pn'pay eighteen months 
serTiCl" and did not have to agTl'C' to the lien. ( SPt> eon-
tract forms attached to County's answer.) l-Ie thus had 
four different methods by which he could apply for ser-
vice without the lien provision. An arrangement was 
also worked out with the Department of Public Welfare, 
to pay not only the down payment, but the monthly ser-
vice charge for any relief cases. 
There is throughout petitioners' statement of facts 
and throughout petitioners' brief an attempt to leave the 
impression with the court that the Commission ran 
"rough-shod" oYer the wishes of the people and by a 
criminal ordinance coerced them into giving a lien on 
their property. The County fully presented its proposed 
plan to the people and listened to their suggestions and 
made changes to meet those suggestions and objections. 
(Ex. S) It heard from practically all of the people in 
the district. Five different methods of applying for 
service were available, only one of which called for a 
lien. Over 75 per cent of the people applied for service 
without protest. It obviously was easier to induce a 
person to make a protest which carried with it no re-
sponsibilities, obligations or liabilities than to induce 
the signing of an application with all of its obligations. 
The County Commission was extremely solicitous of the 
people's wishes. The argument to follow will demon-
strate that its actions were entirely legal. 
9 
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ARGUMENT 
-• 
We will treat the points raised substantially in the ;g 
order that they are developed in the brief of the peti-
tioners. 
POINT I. THERE IS STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY COMMISSION IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SALT 
LAKE CITY SUBURBAN SANITARY DIS-
TRICT. 
(a) Regardless of what construction is placed on 
Chapter 6(a) Title 19, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, the validation act of 1947 confirms the 
Commission's power to issue revenue bonds. 
Before joining issue with the petitioners on their 
specific discussion of Chapter 6(a), we desire to direct 
the court's attention to Chapter 23(b), Laws of Utah, 
1947. By this chapter the legislature expressly recog-
nized and confirmed the power of the County Commission 
to issue revenue bonds under Chapter 6(a), Title 19, 
Utah Code Anno. 1943. Thus, while defendants are con-
fident that they did not exceed the authority of the 
statute under which they proceeded in providing for 
issuance of revenue bonds, they need not rely on that 
authority. Chapter 23(b ), Laws of Utah, 1947, is all the 
statutory authority required for their actions prior to 
May 13, 1947. It expressly validated all proceedings, in-
cluding the creation of the district_ 
10 
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The validating act expressly said that the action of 
any County purporting to creah~ a sl~wer distriet and 
providing for the issnnnee of revenue bonds under 
Chapter 6( a) for the acquisition of sewer facilities, "are 
hereby validated, ratified and confirmed.'' The valida-
tion, ratification and confirmation was to take effect 
"despite any irregularities which may have occurred 
and despite any failure to observe any pertinent statu-
tory requirement as to the filing of petitions, or other-
wise." It further said that the Commission was author-
ized to proceed with the issuance of bonds thereunder, etc. 
This statute clearly validates every procedure taken 
by any board of county commissioners purporting to act 
under the authority of Chapter 6(a). The validation act 
is more than a legislative opinion that procedures under 
consideration were within a previous grant of power; 
it is in itself a retroactive grant of power if any is 
needed. A validation act supplies the authority for the 
procedures validated, even if such authority had pre-
viously been totally absent. The only limitations on the 
curative power of the Legislature are constitutional 
limitations which did not here exist. 
Plaintiff does not deny the complete curative effect 
of a validation act and the cases in great number support 
us in this regard. The general rule is stated in "McQuil-
lan, Third Edition,'' Section 4.15 as follows : 
"The general rule is that a legislature may vali-
date an action of a municipal corporation if the 
legislature had power to authorize it in the first 
instance. It may cure the failure to comply with 
11 
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statutory requirements which might have origi-
nally been dispensed with in the proceedings of 
municipal corporations." 
The rule has been expressly affirmed in Utah. See 
Daggett v. Lynch, 18 Utah 45, 54 P. 1095. In that case, 
Daggett County created indebtedness under certain war-
rants which were void because in excess of the County's 
statutory debt limit. The legislature possessed the 
power at that time to raise the debt limit of a County. 
After the warrants were issued, the legislature validated 
the warrants. The court held that the validating act 
authorizing the issuance of warrants was effective to 
render the warrants valid, even though at the time the 
warrants were issued they were void, because in excess 
of the debt limit of the county. In so holding, the court 
said: 
"The legislature possessed the power, when the 
warrant was issued, to raise the debt limit, and 
the warrant having been issued in excess of that 
limit, the legislature might validate it. An act of 
a county void for want of authority may be vali-
dated by the legislature if it had the power before 
the void act was done to authorize it." 
In June of this year the Tennessee Supreme Court 
considered a curative act, subject to every attack now 
being made against Chapter 23(b), Laws of Utah, 1947, 
and more. The county had levied an ad valorem tax for 
general county purposes in excess of the maximum al-
lowed by general law. The legislature then validated the 
excess, and stated the purposes for which the excess must 
be used. The court held the validating act constitutional. 
12 
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. .I 
It was also held that the nrt did not violate a provision 
prohibiting the suspension of general law for particular 
individuals. The court thus upheld, pyon in an ad valorem 
tax rase, the propriety of retroactive ratifiration of an 
entire}~~ ultra Yires leYy. See Cinn. N. 0. & T. 0. R.R. v. 
Rea Company. ~50 S.\Y. (~d) 60. 
See also, in re ChrZ:stensen's Estate, (Utah), 54 P. 
1095, Hodges r. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 61 L. Ed. 819, and 
the numerous authorities cited in ''McQuillan, Third Edi-
tion,'' Section 4.15 in support of this rule. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that even if 
Chapter 6(a), as enacted in 1933, did not grant to the 
counties any power to borrow money and pledge revenues 
• and issue bonds, the \alidation act of 1947 had the legal 
effect of a retroactive grant of power to the County Com-
mission. The legislature clearly had the power to pro-
vide for revenue bonds, etc., in the first instance, (Tyge-
son v. 1Wagna Water District, Utah, 226 P. 2d 157). The 
validation act leaves the creation of the district and the 
proceedings and the powers of the County Commission 
to borrow money and issue bonds unchallengeable. This 
is a complete answer to Point I of petitioners' brief, 
including the argument on implied repeal. 
We believe that even without this legislative ratifi-
cation, Chapter 6(a) gave adequate power to the Com-
mission. We, accordingly, in the sections to follow, join 
issue with the petitioners' construction of the statutes. 
We do so, however, with the assertion that this issue in-
13 
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sofar as it relates to actions prior to May 13, 1947, is 
moot, because the validation act is itself an adequate 
grant of power. 
(b) Chapter 6(a) Title 19 confers all of the neces-
sary powers. 
As said by our court in Washington County v. Tax 
Commission, 103 Utah 73, 133 P. 2d 564: 
'' 'But a statute is passed as a whole, not in parts 
or sections and is animated by one general pur-
pose and intent. Consequently, each part or sec-
tion should be construed in connection with every 
part or section so as to produce a harmonious 
whole'. Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
Second Edition, Volume 2, page 706.'' 
Article VI Section 23 of the Constitution provides 
that the subject of a statute "shall be clearly expressed 
in its title.'' The purpose may be expressed in general 
terms and the purpose thus expressed is the "subject" 
of the act. In re Monk, 16 Utah 100, 50 P. 810. The title 
is thus important in determining the purpose of the act. 
The title as the act was originally introduced on Febru· 
ary 13, 1933, House Journal page 365, provided as fol-
lows: 
''An act authorizing boards of county commis-
sioners to create flood control districts ... and to 
create special improvement, water supply, sewer 
or sanitary district . . . and to provide for the 
cost of the acquisition and installation of such 
improvements . . . to be paid from assessments 
levied against the property within said district, 
benefited by such improvement or by fees, tolls, 
14 
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rents, or other charges for the use of such im-
provements, or both.'' 
At the time the bill was thus entitled, it did not 
contain what is now Section 8 at all. Thereafter Section 
8 was added and the title to the bill was amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following : 
"And authorizing boards of county commissioners 
to borrow from the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration or other agency where appropriate, ac-
cording to law, the necessary funds and to secure 
and repay the same.'' 
This title did not restrict borrowing to federal projects. 
It expressly says that the act authorizes the district to 
borrow from the R.F .C. or other agencies. 
Since, as petitioners point out, Section 8 of the Chap-
ter did not appear at all in the bill as originally introduc-
ed, their construction would ascribe to the architects of the 
original bill a complete lack of legislative conception and 
a total lack of legislative purpose. If the only grant of 
power to borrow money were in Section 8, then the origi-
nal bill, which lacked Section 8, in effect had no practical 
purpose. Districts when created have no current funds 
and it is nonsensical to assume a plan where laborers and 
materialmen wait for payment until a system is completed 
and tolls return the costs. Nor is it sensible to assume 
that special assessments could be payable by everyone 
on an expensive sewer project in one payment at the be-
ginning of construction. To "provide" for a sewer, 
financing over a period of time was and is essential. The 
act must be given a sensible construction which will ac-
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<·omplish the purposes sought by the statute. Tax Comm. 
vs. Logan, 88 Ut. 406, 54 Fed. 1197. 
We submit that before Section 8 was added, a grant 
of power adequate to the purposes of the act certainly 
was intended by the framers. When Section 8 was added 
' it was not intended to negate the powers previously con-
ferred. It was rather to supplement than to supersede 
the powers already granted. Neither the title of the bill 
nor the express wording of Section 8 would require a 
construction which would limit the borrowing of money 
to federal projects. Even if Section 8 were to be so 
construed, Section 1 of the act was itself broad enough to 
permit it. 
Section 8 expressly authorizes the borrowing from 
either public or private agencies, persons, corporations, 
or individuals. The construction placed upon this lan-
guage by petitioners is far-fetched indeed. The section 
starts out by referring to county commissions "creating 
special improvements as hereinabove described.'' The 
"hereinabove described" can only refer to Section 1. Sec-
tion 8 then goes on to say that such county commissions 
are authorized to create and operate such projects and 
improvements as may be appropriate and possible under 
the laws of the United States. The language contem-
plates the creation and operation of projects as author-
ized "hereinabove" under Section 1, and projects oper-
ated under appropriate laws of the United States. It 
then goes on ''and in connection therewith'' the County 
may enter into contracts with the United States or other 
private or public agency, person, corporation or indi-
16 
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Yidual for borrowing money, issuing bonds, etc. This 
language clearly refers to both types of project. That 
is, those created" as hereinabove described" and projects 
created under appropriate laws of the United States. It 
does not matter what motivated the legislature to adopt 
Section 8, so long as the language which it adopted ex-
pressly permits borrowing from private agencies. The 
section as adopted expressly permitted borrowing from 
private sources. The amendment to the title of the act 
which was made when Section 8 was added declares its 
purpose to be to permit boards to borrow money from 
the R.F.C., or other agencies. If the language of Sec-
tion 8 is to be construed as narrowly as petitioners re-
quest, there would be a serious doubt as to whether the 
description of the purpose contained in the title was not 
defeated by Section 8 as so construed. The title clearly 
says that its purpose is to permit the borrowing of money 
from the R.F.C. or other agency. Section 8 says that 
county commissions creating projects as "hereinabove 
described'' (Section 1) may also create projects under 
appropriate laws of the United States, and in connection 
"therewith" (referring to both types of projects) the 
commission may borrow money from public or private 
sources. Such a construction meets with common sense 
and is in harmony with the purpose expressed in the 
title. It permits county commissions to carry into effect 
the objectives of the act, while the construction urged 
by the petitioners would render the act useless. 
In view of the grants of power in Section 1 and the 
supplemental express grant of power in Section 8, there 
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<·.au be little doubt that the County Commission had the 
power 1 o borrow money. The granting of express power 
to enter into contracts with the United States is not new 
to Utah legislative procedure. Almost all of the water 
bills adopted by our Utah Legislature have so provided. 
(See, for example, the Utah Water and Power Board 
Act, Laws of Utah, 1947, Ch. 141, Section 4, Subdivision 
8; the Water Conservancy Act, Section 100-11-14(e); 
the Local Improvement District Acts, Law~ of Utah, 
1951, Chapter 32, Section 11.) 
But even if we were wrong as to the construction of 
both Sections 1 and 8, nevertheless, the legislative vali-
dation in 1947 was itself an express and direct grant of 
power to borrow from a private agency, to issue bonds 
and pledge revenues for repayment. 
(c) The Practical Construction given Chapter 6(a), 
Title 19, Utah Code Anno. 1943, by the County 
Commission is reasonable, and· even if another 
were possible is entitled to judicial respect. 
The Board of County Commissioners has construed 
Chapter 6(a) as a grant of power to finance a sewer 
project with private agencies by a revenue bond issue. 
The reasonableness of that construction, we believe, we 
have already made clear. The board's construction in 
1947 and again in 1952 being reasonable, is entitled to 
judicial respect. See Utah Power & Light Comparny v. 
Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P. 2d. 542, 
where the court said at page 187: 
''Consistent administrative interpretation over 
the years by the officers charged with the duty of 
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applying the statute and making ea<'h part work 
efficiently and smoothly are entitled to great 
weight by the courts.·' 
See also Section 78. 4~ ... m. Jr. 392 in note 20, with some 
fifty cases supporting the statement that: ''The practical 
interpretation of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by 
the executiYe department charged with its administration 
or enforcement is entitled to the highest respect from 
the courts.'' 
(d) When a Legislature readopts a Statute without 
change after notorious construction by officers 
charged with administering it, the presumptlon 
is that the Legislature knew of the construction 
and adopted it. 
Closely related to the principle discussed under sub-
division (c) hereof is the principle of law that when the 
legislature ''readopts a statutory act without change 
after uniform and notorious construction by officers re-
quired to administer it, the presumption is that the 
legislature knew of such construction and adopted it in 
re-enacting the statute.'' Utah Power & Light Company 
v. Public service Commission, supra. We do not here 
have a legislative readoption of the statute, but there is 
through the validation act an express recognition by the 
legislature of the construction placed upon this statute 
by the County Commission. The statute recognizes ex-
pressly that county commissions had construed this 
statute to permit them to borrow money on revenue bond 
issues from private sources. Knowing that the county 
commissions had so construed it, the legislature ratified 
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this construction. We believe that this legislative recog-
nition of the prior construction by the county commission 
is entitled to weight by the court in construing the 
statute, although we recognize that the principle of re-
adoption of a statute is probebly not directly involved as 
such. 
POINT II. CHAPTER 6 (a) TITLE 19 HAS NEVER 
BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION OR 
OTHERWISE. 
Repeals by implication will not be upheld from the 
single fact that acts passed at different times deal with 
the same subject matter, in whole or in part. The focal 
point of the inquiry is the intent of the legislature in the 
enactment of the alleged repealing act. (See 50 Am. Jur. 
541, section 535) In determining that intent, there are a 
number of principles universally accepted, which are 
most helpful. 
The paramount principle is that repeals by impli-
cation are not favored. This is a maxim announced by 
every court in the land. Early statements by the Utah 
Court are found in University of Utah v. Richards, 20 
Utah 457, and Neldon v. Clark, 20 Utah 382. Even in the 
rare instances when the court has declared an implied 
repeal, it has expressed its deep antipathy toward such 
declarations. In Western Beverage v. Hansen, 96 P. 2d. 
1105 (Utah 1939), the court said: 
''Differences of time will be disregarded in con-
struing a code if, by disregarding them and look-
ing at the work as a whole, harmony can thereby 
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be produced, but if this provP~ in1possible, and if, 
after e.rha,usfinp ercry scheme of rennwiliatim1, 
there still remains a palpable and irn·sj)'J'l'Ssibll· 
conflict, the Supreme Court i~ eompl'llt'd in the 
absence of anything el~P indicatiYt' of ll'gi~lative 
will, to determine the legislativP will by adopting 
the lah'st declaration of the legislature.'' 
As noted in the quotation above set forth, there must be 
an "irrepressible" and "palpable'' conflict. The mere 
fact that two acts co-exist on the same subject matter 
has never been held to be enough unless this irrepressible 
conflict exists. Not one single instance of conflict IS 
pointed out by the petitioners and in fact none exists. 
Further, the legislature here has affirmatively in-
dicated that it did not intend to impliedly repeal Chapter 
6(a). To begin with, the act which petitioners contend 
is an implied repeal of Chapter 6(a), was approved by 
the same legislature that adopted the validation act. The 
act relied upon by petitioners for the implied repeal is 
Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1947. The very same legis-
lature passed the validating act on the very same day. 
See Chapter 23(b ), Laws of Utah, 1947. Both acts were 
passed March 13, 1947. The so-called repealing act was 
approved :l\Iarch 17th and the validating act was ap-
proved March 19th. There is thus something in addition 
to the words of the statutes clearly indicative of legis-
lative intent not to repeal. When enactments, allegedly 
in conflict, were enacted on the same day, the presump-
tion against implied repeal is particularly strong. Gra-
ham v. Goodell, 282 U.S. 409. The same is true where the 
statute alleged to have been repealed is an important 
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law of long standing. .Attorney General v. Joyce, 233 
i\lieh. 619, 207 N.W. 863. 
rrhere is another rule which helps govern the courts 
in determining whether or not there has been an implied 
repeal. A statute in order to be held to constitute an 
implied repeal of an older statute must cover the entire 
scope of the act repealed so that the former may be in-
tended as a substitute. Where the old statute contains 
subject matters not covered by the later statute, an 
implied repeal will not be assumed, because it leaves 
those other fields then without legislation. Thus, in re 
Goddard, 7 4 P. 2d 818, the court said that: 
"for a law to repeal or supercede an earlier sta-
tute, the later law must constitute a revision of 
the entire subject, so that the court may say it 
was intended as a substitute.'' 
In Tombstone v. Macia, 245 Pac. 677, 46 A.L.R. 828, 
it was held that a statute permitting the issuance of 
municipal bonds for any lawful and necessary purpose 
was not repealed by the re-enactment of a prior statute 
authorizing the issuance of bonds for any purpose for 
which the municipality might grant a franchise. The 
court's reasoning was that a broad or general act could 
not be impliedly repealed by a narrower act. See also 
People ex rel Palmer v. National Life, (Illinois) 10 N.E. 
2d. 398. 
Certainly there was no attempt in 194 7 to revise the 
entire subject matter of the 1933 act. Chapter 6{a) is 
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I' 
concerned with the creation of "'Speeial improvement, 
water supply, sewer and sanitary distriets ... and flood 
control districts.·' The 1947 act only provided for sys-
tems for water and sewer systems. 
Chapter 6(a) authorized the Commission to con-
struct drains, levees and flood barriers in addition to the 
facilities necessary for water and sewer systems. The 
194 7 act did not. 
Chapter 6 (a) provided for financing through the 
levying of special assessments on the property benefited. 
The 1947 act did not. 
Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1947, does not even con-
tain the normal provision that "laws in conflict here-
with are hereby repealed.'' 
It is respectfully submitted (1) That the legislature 
affirmatively indicated that it did not want Chapter 
6(a) repealed, when it validated Chapter 6(a) and au-
thorized expressly the County Commission to continue 
to proceed under Chapter 6 (a) to issue bonds, etc. ; ( 2) 
that Chapter 6 (a) provides for several things not per-
mitted under the 1947 act, thus demonstrating that the 
1947 act was not intended to be a complete revision; (3) 
that the 1947 act does not even purport by its own lan-
guage to repeal acts in conflict therewith; ( 4) that there 
is no irrepressible conflict in the two acts. 
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POINT III. CHAPTER 6(a) IS NOT UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL. 
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Chap-
ter 6 (a) on the grounds, first, that it provides for a 
special commission assuming municipal functions in 
violation of Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Consti-
tution; second, that it vests supervisory control of dis-
trict functions in the County Commission, which is not 
directly responsible only to the people of the district; 
and third, that it violates the due process clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions. In regard to Article VI, 
Section 29, petitioners assume without either discussion 
or citation of authority that the words, "municipal func-
tion'' used in Section 29, include counties, and in the 
teeth of every decision ever handed down by the Utah 
Supreme Court on this point, petitioners contend that 
this district is a ''special commission.'' Petitioners are 
wrong on both points. 
Section 29 prohibits the legislature from delegating 
to any ''special commission'' the power to interfere 
with any municipal improvement or to perform any 
"municipal functions". Unless county functions are in-
eluded in the term "municipal functions", Section 29 
will not apply here, because the sewer district does not, 
and under Section 1 of the sewer act cannot, include 
within its boundaries any city or town. The purpose of 
Section 29 is not to declare the sanctity of functions as 
such, but to protect the autonomy of cities. The Supreme 
Court has on many occasions indicated that it considered 
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the words "municipal function" to rd\n· only to the 
functions of cities and towns. In Logan City r. Pubf.ic 
Utilities Commission, 7~ Utnh 536, at 566, ~71 P. 961, the 
court said that the purpose of thh~ constitutional pro-
Yision is to hold inviolate the right of self-government 
to "cities and towns", with respect to municipal im-
provements and performance of municipal functions. 
In Lehi City c. J.lleiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d. 530, 
the court held that a metropolitan water district was not 
a municipal corporation, and that it was not performing 
municipal functions within the contemplation of the Con-
stitution. The court noted various definitions of the word 
"municipal". Mr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opin-
ion, went into the subject in considerable detail. He 
states that a municipal corporation is defined as a cor-
poration created for the purposes of government, or of 
or pertaining to a town or city. He then states that: 
"Entities which are designed to distribute water, 
power, gas, or to dispose of sewage, deal in ser-
vices, and, incidental to the distribution of service 
or of any kind of commodity, there must be 
regulation and administration ; but this is not 
what we think of as government.'' 
The question of whether a county's functions as such 
were intended to be protected by Article 29 was squarely 
raised in the Tygesen v. Magna Water Compa;n.y case 
~: (Utah) 226 P. 2d. 127, and the court indica ted that it had 
fl some doubt that it did, but did not squarely pass upon 
~ the question. See also Union Pacific v. Public Service 
~ Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P. 2d. 469. 
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rrhere is, therefore, considerable doubt that the 
wordH "municipal function" as contained in Section 29 
' ' 
were in any event intended to protect the autonomy of 
counties. There is also considerable doubt that the 
ownership and operation of a sewer as such is a county's 
function. There is not a single county in the State of 
Utah, so far as we know, that owns or operates a sewer 
plant as a part of the county's function. Sewer systems 
and water systems are historically pursuits of cities and 
towns, and the right of a city or town to operate a sewer, 
water, light, etc. system could logically have been in-
tended as the subject of protection by Section 29. 
Counties have not historically performed such functions, 
and, therefore, even if the court should hold that 
''county functions'' were protected by Section 29, it 
should not hold that the operation of a sewer is a county 
function in which the county's right of self-government 
should be protected. 
A more conclusive answer to petitioners' argument 
in regard to Article VI Section 29 is that this sewer 
district is not a special commission. This question of 
special commissions has been before the Supreme Court 
in numerous cases. In Tygesen v. Magna Water Com-
pany, supra, 226 P. 2d. 127, this question of whether an 
improvement district was a special commission was pre-
sented to the court. The court refused to determine 
whether Section 29 was intended to protect counties, 
because it said that the argument was conclusively met 
by the fact that the improvement district was not a 
special commission. The problem was also presented to 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court in Lehi City v. Jlcilinp, supra, 87 Utah ~~~7, 
48 P. 2d. 530. In the J.lle·ilin_q rase, at page ~48, Section 
29 was construed. The court said that a metropoli tau 
water distrirt is not a sperial rommission within tht> 
meaning of Section 29. 
The court then went on to say: 
"It is contended the act is unconstitutional as an 
attempt to unlawfully delegate the power of taxa-
tion to a special commission and to interfere in 
city and town affairs in violation of the provi-
sions of article 6, section 29. 
''This contention cannot be sustained for the 
reason that the board of directors to whom the 
management and control of the district has been 
intrusted, and which is to exercise the powers and 
perform the functions of the public agency thus 
created, does not come within the designation 
'special commission, private corporation or asso-
ciation' to which the inhibitions of the section 
apply. Nor does the act provide for interference 
with any municipal improvement, money, prop-
erty or effects. The power of control vested in 
the board of directors is over the property, im-
provements, money and effects of the district, and 
not that of any of the cities or towns whose ter-
ritorial boundaries may be coincidental with that 
of the district or included therein. The powers 
of the board are limited by the act to the levying 
of taxes for the public purposes mentioned there-
in.'' 
~~ The same general proposition was set forth in 
-i Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, supra, where the 
~~ court noted : 
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''Assuming, without conceding, that the term 
'mu~icipal functions' as used in Art. VI, Sec. 29, 
apphes to the functions of counties as well as 
cities and towns, nevertheless, plaintiff's conten-
tion is not tenable. The management and control 
of the Improvement Districts and its properties 
and effects are by the Act vested in a Board of 
Trustees even though these districts are initiated 
by the county commission. Their operations will 
be separate and distinct from any of the functions 
assumed by the counties in those unincorporated 
cities or towns. Although these operations might 
be in the same territorial bowndaries as the im-
provement districts, they will have no control 
over the property or effects of the counties or of 
the manner of the performance of any of the 
functions which the counties have assumed." 
We submit that the controlling principle in those 
cases was that the district, when created, would not be 
administering the funds _of the county, or any city which 
might be embraced within the district boundaries. Rather, 
the district was administering its own funds, properties, 
improvements and effects. That controlling principle is 
present in the instant case. The sewer district, which is 
created under Chapter 6(a) will not expend the money 
of the county, nor will it be controlling, managing or 
governing the county's properties, effects or improve-
ments. The portions of the quotes underscored above 
show clearly that this is the controlling feature. 
Petitioners seek to distinguish those cases on the 
grounds that in the instant case the board of county 
commissioners becomes also the governing board of the 
district, while in the cases cited above the county com-
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missioners were not the office1·s of the distrid cren ted. 
This we submit is immaterial. rrhe eases and authorities 
to follow will show that this practice of having the gov-
erning board of an existing political subdivision become 
the governing board of an improvement district is uni-
n~rsally accepted and applied. All of the standard works 
and the courts have upheld the practice of having the 
members of the county commission become the governing 
board of improvement districts. 
This practice is not unusual, even to Utah law. For 
many years the Supreme Court members also served as 
members of the Board of Pardons. The provisions 
making the judges of the Supreme Court members of the 
Board of Pardons did not convert the Board of Pardons 
into the Supreme Court, nor did the Supreme Court 
become the Board of Pardons. There were two separate 
legal entities. True, both were manned by the same indi-
viduals. But, when these individuals were sitting on the 
Supreme Court Bench, they functioned as the Supreme 
Court of the state. When the same individuals were 
sitting on the Board of Pardons, they functioned as the 
Board of Pardons, and the identity of the members did 
not merge the Board of Pardons and the Supreme Court 
into a single organization. 
In many of the departments of the state, the same 
individuals sit in various separate capacities. The same 
persons are the Commissioners of Finance and also the 
members of the State Land Board, (See 82(c)-2-12, 
U.C.A. 1943). The three members of the engineering 
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commission are by statute the identical members who 
operate the State Road Commission, (82(c)-1-12), the 
State Aeronautics Commission ( 4-0-2, U.C.A. 1943) and 
the State Building Board, (10-0-1, U.C.A. 1943). It is 
thus absolutely contrary to uniform practice to argue 
that the district becomes the county and the county is 
merged with the sewer district, simply because the gov-
erning board of the county and the governing board of 
the sewer district is composed of the same individuals. 
The cases uniformly uphold our position in this regard. 
The rule as stated by the standard works is as follows: 
(17 Am. Jur. 794, Drains & Sewers, Section 27) 
''The qualifications of officers of an improvement 
district and the manner in which they shall be 
chosen are matters which rest entirely within the 
discretion of the legislature (which) may desig-
nate an agency to appoint them or even delegate 
the administration of the district affairs to county 
or municipal functionaries either in whole or in 
part." (And see 28 C.J.S. 254 to the same effect.) 
In Nuwn v. Green Company, 161 Iowa 26, 141 N.W. 
2d. 716, the officers of a drainage district were, under 
the act, to be appointed rather than elected by the 
people. The court said that the manner in which the 
officers of a drainage district shall be selected rests 
entirely with the legislature. Thus, it is not essential to 
the validity of a statute allowing the organization of 
drainage district that it shall require the officers to be 
chosen by the electors of the district. 
The power of appointment may be conferred on a 
judge, Elliott v. McCrea, 23 Idaho 524, and Patterick v. 
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Carbon Trater Conscrrancy District, supra, and tht' duty 
of administering the affairs of a distrid. may be impost>d 
on the incumbent of an ~:.•xisting ot1'iet'. Lamlou'ucrs u. 
People, 113 Del. 296 .. Although the Constitution makes 
districts legal entities, it is within the legislative dis-
cretion to provide that their affairs shall be adminis-
tered by the existing municipal officers. New Iberia v. 
Sew Iberia Drainage District, 106 Louisiana 651, 31 
So. 305. 
Petitioners· next argument is founded on Article I, 
Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that the 
political power is inherent in the people. The argument 
of petitioners seems to be that because the County Com-
mission is elected by the people of the county as a whole, 
rather than merely by the smaller sewer district, the 
people have been deprived of the right of free govern-
ment contrary to Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. 
This article and section have never been construed so as 
to make the governing body of an improvement district 
directly responsible only to the people, of that district, 
by election ; again petitioners' argument flies right in 
the teeth of the existing cases. This article and section 
were before the court in Patterick v. Carbon Water Con-
servancy District, 106 Utah 55, 145 P. 2d. 503. The court 
there upheld the constitutionality of the Water Con-
servancy Act. Under the Water Conservancy Act, the 
governing board is appointed by the district court, rather 
than being elected by the people. Thus, the right of the 
people to elect a governing board was held not to be 
guaranteed by the constitutional provision relied upon. 
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Further, in a conservancy district it would be a rare 
instance in which the people included within a conserv-
ancy district were identical with the people voting for 
the district judge who appointed the governing board. 
In the Patterick case, the conservancy district was only 
as broad as Carbon County, whereas, the Seventh Judi-
cial District includes several counties. Further, under 
the Water Conservancy Act, counties from different 
judicial districts may be included within the same con-
servancy district. Thus, a conservancy district could 
embrace Salt Lake and Davis counties. The proceedings 
would be held in only one district court and one district 
judge would appoint the governing members. In such 
an instance, if the proceedings were initiated in Salt 
Lake County, the people of Davis County would not have 
a vote, even on the judge who appointed the board mem-
bers, still the Patterick case said the Water Conservancy 
Act is constitutional. 
In the M eiling case, supra, Article I, Section 2 was 
raised, because the district members were appointed, 
rather than elected. Justice Folland said: 
''Objection is urged that the members of the 
board are not elected by the electors of the dis-
trict, but are appointed by the governing authori-
ties of the cities or towns as representatives of 
such municipalities. "'\Ve, however, find no pro-
vision of the Constitution which limits the power 
of the Legislature to provide for the governing 
or control of such public agencies by officers 
selected in the manner provided rather than by 
election.'' 
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Thus, on at least two occasions our Utah Supreme 
Court has reviewed the argument now made by peti-
tioners. Petitioners do not cite a single case which 
upholds them. Further, their argument is contrary to 
the uniform practice in almost every department of 
government in the state. The members of the Department 
of Agriculture are appointed by the Governor. The de-
partment functions only on persons engaged in agri-
cultural pursuits. If we followed petitioners' argument, 
the appointive power (the Governor) should, therefore, 
be elected only by people engaged in agricultural pur-
suits or else every function of the agricultural depart-
ment deprives the people of their right of self-govern-
ment guaranteed by Article I, Section 2. 
We submit that the proper construction of Article I, 
Section 2 is to guarantee to the people the right to elect 
members of the legislature and to have vested in the 
legislature the legislative branch of the government. 
The legislature then has the power to carry into effect 
all proper legislative functions. Sewage disposal, water 
conservancy, flood control, and like improvement dis-
tricts are problems of general public concern; they have 
importance beyond the geographical limits of the par-
ticular district. They call for the exercise of legislative 
power. The legislature may act directly with reference 
to a particular problem or it may delegate that authority 
to an administrative agency either elected or appointed. 
There is no case nor authority which will uphold the 
position of the petitioners, that the governing board of 
the district must as a matter of constitutional law be 
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directly responsible only to the people within the district. 
Their objection was expressly repudiated in both the 
Pattcrick and the Meiling cases, and as said by Judge 
Folland, the court was unable to find any provision 
which limits the power of the legislature "to provide 
for the governing or control of such public agencies by 
officers selected'' by election rather than by appointment. 
(a) Chapter 6(a) Does Not Violate the Due Process 
Clauses. 
We now come to the argument of petitioners that 
Chapter 6 (a) fails to accord to the people of the district 
due process of law. In support of this contention peti-
tioners cite four cases, to wit: Argyle v. Johnson, 39 
Utah 500, 118 P. 487; Lundberg v. Irrigation District, 
40 Utah 83; 119 P. 1309; Patterick v. Carbon Water Con-
servancy District, 106 Utah 55; and Tygesen v. Mag'IW 
Water Company, 226 P. 2d. 127. None of these cases 
involves a revenue bond issue. Each of them involves 
the power to levy a special assessment, which becomes 
a lien on the land by order of the district, or the district 
has the general power to levy ad valorem taxes. Due 
process of law in regard to districts levying special 
assessments or imposing general taxes does require 
notice and an opportunity to be heard at some time prior 
to the lien becoming effective. 
Petitioners recognize that there is a difference be-
tween these tax and assessment cases on the one hand 
and revenue financing, or special fund cases, on the other. 
They argue that this case should fall within the prin-
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ciples laid down in the special assPssment. or tax eases, 
rather than under the cases cited by petitioners on page 
33 of their brief. 
The only reason cited by petitioners in support of 
their contention that this revenue bond financing should 
not be controlled by the revenue bond cases is that here 
some of the people under the application for service 
have agreed that their delinquent bill may become a lien 
against the property. They say that these people were 
coerced into connecting on to the sewer by a criminal 
ordinance and they erroneously say the people were 
compelled as a condition to connecting on to said system 
to give a lien on their property. Thus, say petitioners, 
the county is attempting to do indirectly what the law 
will not permit the county to do directly. That is, forcing 
a lien on the property without notice or an opportunity 
to be heard. 
The chief basis of the claim of coercion is that there 
is an ordinance requiring persons to connect to a sewer 
system where available. No authority is cited by peti-
tioners to challenge the legality of this ordinance. The 
ordinance was enacted first in 1942, five years prior to 
any attempt to create a sewer district. At the time the 
ordinance was passed, there were other sewer systems 
in the county. There can be no question concerning the 
power of the County Commission to pass such an ordi-
nance. 
Enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a regu-
lation passed in the legitimate exercise of the police 
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power is not the taking of property without due process 
of law. 
This question was squarely presented in Hutchinson 
v. Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303, 57 L.Ed. 520. The case is 
directly in point. There, the city of Valdosta required 
all persons residing in the city to connect to a sanitary 
sewer. Mrs. Hutchinson claimed that the statute was 
unconstitutional, that extreme and arbitrary measures 
were used to compel her to connect, without giving her 
notice or a hearing, and without bringing condemnation 
proceedings to have her premises declared a nuisance to 
public health. 
The facts showed that the city was an inland town, 
built high on a pine ridge, with no swamp nearby. The 
city's population did not exceed 5,000-6,000 and covered 
an area of two miles. The city passed an ordinance re-
quiring property owners,'' residing upon any street along 
which sewer mains had been laid, within thirty days 
after the passage of the ordinance, to install water closets 
in their houses and connect the same with the main sewer 
pipe, and to provide the closets with water, so that they 
may be ready for use in the ordinary and usual way, and 
such persons shall not be permitted to use or keep on 
their premises a surface closet.'' The ordinance goes 
on to condemn as a nuisance any house which does not 
have a closet and provides that any owner who does 
not comply is subject to a fine not exceeding $200.00 
or a jail sentence. 
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"Jirs. Hutchinson had a woodl'll building with "room 
sufficient only for her own family." To eomply with the 
ordinance she would be compelled to build an nddition 
to the house for installation of the bathroom and also 
to go to the expense of connecting with the sewer. This, 
she alleged, would cost her a considerable sum of money. 
The city was threatening to arrest her for non-compli-
ance. The part of the city where she resided was thinly 
settled. She alleged that there was no necessity on 
account of health or sanitation for her to install a water 
closet or to connect with the sewer. 
The court said that it was clear that she had had no 
notice nor opportunity to be heard before the commence-
ment of the proceedings to force her to connect. She 
said that the ordinance ''was passed and the proceedings 
against her taken (in violation of) the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, because it provides 
neither for notice nor an opportunity to be heard before 
the premises are condemned and the owner required to 
comply with its provisions.'' 
The court said : 
''The ordinance does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. According to the bill the city is given the 
power through its mayor and council 'to enact 
such rules and regulations for the transaction of 
its business and for the welfare and proper gov-
ernment thereof,' as the mayor and council may 
deem best; and the bill shows that the courts of 
the state decided that the ordinance was within 
this delegation of power. It is the commonest 
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exercise of the police power of a state or city to 
provide for a system of sewers, and to compel 
property owners to connect therewith. And this 
duty may be enforced by criminal penalties. Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S.138, 53 L. Ed. 
914, 29 S. Ct. Rep. 560. It may be that an arbi-
trary exercise of the power could be restrained, 
but it would have to be palpably so to justify a 
court in interfering with so salutary a power and 
one so necessary to the public health. There is 
certainly nothing in the facts alleged in the bill 
to justify the conclusion that the city was induced 
by anything in the enactment of the ordinance 
other than the public good, or that such was not 
its effect." 
The rule as thus stated by the United States Supreme 
Court is stated to be the general law by 9 Am. Jur. 210, 
Buildings, Section 14, where the rule is stated as follows: 
"Statutes and ordinances compelling owners of 
buildings to install water closets and to connect 
their premises with public sewers when not 
plainly unreasonable or arbitrary are also within 
the police power. An arbitrary exercise of this 
power may be restrained, but it must be palpably 
so to justify a court in interfering with so salu-
tary a power and one so necessary to the public 
health. The fact that it will cost money to comply 
with such a law is not a sufficient reason for 
declaring it invalid where the expenditures re-
quired are reasonable and fair. Nor is it usually 
necessary that notice and an opportunity to be 
heard be given to a property owner before the 
passage of the law, or before an order enforcing 
compliance therewith is made.'' 
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See also New Orleaus Pltblic StTrice Commissiou r. 
Se1c Orleans, ~81 U.S. tiS~, 74 L.Ed. 111-l and Atlantic 
Coastline Railrod l'. Ooldsboro, ~~~~ U.8. 548. 
The ordinance requiring persons to rpa::-;e using 
privies, cesspools, etc., is thus a perfectly legitimate 
exercise of the police power. It is legislative in nature. 
Legislative due process does not require notice or hear-
ing. Utah Power &; Light vs. P.S.C., 107 Utah 155, at 
168. This legislative power has been granted to county 
commissioners by Section 19-5-36, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, which provides : 
''They may make and enforce ... all such local 
... sanitary regulations as are not in conflict 
with general laws.'' 
And by Section 19-5-49, which provides : 
''They may make such provision for the preser-
vation of health in the county . . . as they may 
deem necessary and provide for paying the ex-
penses thereof.'' 
See also Sec. 19-5-80 and 19-5-82 on Health Officers, and 
Section 19-5-87 authorizing enactment of enforcement 
ordinances. 
The distinction which petitioners thus try to make 
to take this case out of the general holdings of the 
revenue bond cases and place it under the principles of 
the assessment cases simply is not sound. No one's con-
stitutional rights were abridged or impaired by the 
ordinance requiring a connection. The discussion to 
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follow will demonstrate that no one was coerced into 
giving a lien on his property, nor is there anything 
"palpably" arbitrary or unreasonable about the sewer 
ordinances. 
The case is controlled by the principles announced 
in the so-called special fund cases cited on page 33 by 
petitioners, to wit: Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 
279 Pac. 878; Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 144, 28 
P. 2d. 144; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 
28 P. 2d. 161; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 
Utah 203, 74 P. 2d. 1191; Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79 P. 2d. 61. No notice or hear-
ing is required, because no lien is created by the district. 
Any lien which might become effective is a pure matter 
of contract, and while the ordinance requiring a connec-
tion is coercive, five separate application contracts were 
available-four of which had no lien agreement. Even 
the one which agreed that the bill might become a lien 
did not place a lien on the property. The lien became 
effective only when the bill was 90 days or more delin-
quent and could not be recorded as such until six months 
delinquent. Of course, no one would contend that a lien 
can not be created by contract. 
In the case of Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 
94 Utah 203, 7 4 P. 2. 1191, the court said on page 216 
that where the power is given to a city to issue revenue 
bonds and no method of executing it are linked with the 
·grant of power ''any reasonable means which will effec-
tuate that purpose is lawful.'' The court also noted on 
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page ~25 that it was of the opinion that in tlw ah~etwt~ 
of a legislatiYe requirement that a reYennf• bond be 
submitted to a vote of the people, that the eity did not 
have to do so. All of these special funds cases involving 
Article XIV, Section 3, presented the question of whether 
a revenue bond created "a debt". Having held that it 
did not, the necessary conclusion then had to be drawn 
that it did not have to be submitted to a vote of the 
people. 
In the instant case, Section 1 of the act expressly 
authorized the district to acquire systems and to pay 
for the same from tolls and charges or from assessments, 
or both. Section 8 authorized the district to issue bonds. 
Section 8 authorized the district to fix rules and regula-
tions for the use of the facility. Nowhere is there a 
requirement that the matter be submitted to the people 
for a vote of approval. Because in the sale of revenue 
bonds, the district does not pledge the private property 
in the district nor obligate itself to assess or tax the 
property of the district, nor create a burden on the 
property in the district, it is not taking property, and 
the due process clauses simply do not apply. 
In the Utah Power &; Light Compa;ny case, cited 
above, the matter had been submitted to a vote of the 
people, although the court held that such would not have 
been necessary, because the bonds involved were revenue 
bonds. Here the County Commission did go to the people 
with the plan, even though such would not have been 
necessary. In a special election, it is notorious that only 
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a very small percentage of the people express themselves. 
The percentage is often lower than 10 per cent. In the 
manner adopted by the County Commission here, we 
have heard from nearly 100 per cent of the people, either 
in the form of a protest or an application for service, 
and over 75 per cent of all the people affected have 
applied for service without protest. Like in the Utah 
Power & Light case, this consultation with the people 
would not have been necessary under any constitutional 
requirements, but the consultation with the people does 
not change the legal effect of the proceedings, nor does 
it cut down the legal power of the Commission. Such 
was the square holding of the Utah Power & Light case. 
J.VIixed up with the argument on due process are 
conglomerate assertions and suggestions that the sewer 
plan itself throws an oppressive burden upon the people. 
Of course, the Hutchinson v. Valdosta case, supra, which 
expressly holds that an ordinance compelling people to 
connect to a sewer is _constitutional, places one limitation 
on its holding. If the requirement is palpably oppressive 
and highly unreasonable and in cost so high as to be 
confiscatory, then requiring a connection might be re-
strained. Petitioners neither allege nor argue that the 
plan is so palpably oppressive as to be confiscatory, but. 
they do hint that it places an unfair burden on the initial 
subscriber. The basis of the Supreme Court holding that 
enforcement could be restrained would not rest upon the 
failure to hold hearings prior to the enactment. Legis-
lative enactments do not require notice and hearing. Utah 
Power & Light v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 
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150. The ba~is of its unconstitutionality wouhl lH' that 
because it was so oppressiYt', people could not l'l'a~c..mably 
comply and it would amount to a confiscation of property 
without compensation. It was upon this basis that utility 
rates fixed by public regulation were sometimes declared 
to be unconstitutional. Rate-making, of course, was 
legislative, and the manner of fixing rates being legis-
lative, could not be held to lack the essentials of pro-
cedural due process. Utah Power & Light u. Pttblic Ser-
vice Comnzissioll, supra, 107 Utah 155, 168. But if the 
final result of the rate was so high as to be confiscatory, 
then it would amount to a taking of property without 
compensation. 
Petitioners have not contended that the down pay-
ment and monthly service fee are so high as to confiscate 
the people's property and render the statute unconsti-
tutional. As noted above in the Statement of Facts, the 
contract forms (which are attached to the County's 
answer) permit any individual to connect to the sewer 
for a $50.00 down payment, $10.00 a month for an addi-
tional ten months and $3.00 a month when service is com-
menced. The ordinance even permits the individual to 
finance the cost of building the line from the street to 
his house. If he desired, the district would build this 
line, and he could pay the cost of building that line at 
the rate of $10.00 a month. Therefore, any individual 
could connect to the sewer, have the line completed to 
his house and could receive service with a down payment 
of only $50.00. The $10.00 per month payment would 
run either for ten months, if he built his own line, or 
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about 25 months if the district built his house line. 
Thereafter, the charge was $3.00 per month. 
As noted above, there was no requirement that he 
give a lien to secure payment of his bill. Even on the 
time basis outlined above, he could post $54.00 (18 
months' service charge) and there was no agreement to 
give a lien. He could pay $750.00 for the privilege of 
hooking on to the sewer and would never thereafter be 
required to pay anything toward the sewer's cost. He 
had the assurance that if others who paid on a time 
basis finally paid less than this $750.00, the difference 
would be refunded to him. He could finance the $750.00 
from private sources. He could finance it with the district 
in 24 equal monthly payments. He could start out on 
one of the time bases mentioned and later decide to pay 
the entire $750.00. Even the contract to give a lien did 
not create a present lien. The lien became effective only 
if he failed to pay his bill, and permitted it to remain in 
default 90 days or more. 
In relief cases, an arrangement was made for pay-
ment of the connection fee and monthly service charge 
by the Department of Public Welfare. The $750.00 total 
cost for a sewer system and a treatment plant is, as the 
petitioners well know, well within the limits of such costs 
throughout the nation. It is, therefore, easy to under-
stand why they have not contended by an analysis of 
the facts that the ordinance of 1942, which required 
persons to connect to a sewer system was so oppressive 
as to confiscate property. It is, therefore, respectfully 
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submitted that there was nothing unconstitutional in 
requiring the people to discontinue privies, cesspools, 
and septic tanks in the concentrated areas of Salt Lake 
County, and the authorities cited above conclusively up-
hold the legislative power of the county to so provide. 
The basis of payment was such that no person could 
justifiably claim that the cost of complying with the 
ordinance was so burdensome as to be confiscatory and, 
therefore, unconstitutional. 
On page 37 of the brief they complain of five things 
and then say that nothing could be more unreasonable 
and oppressive than this. In conclusion, therefore, on 
this due process point, we desire to give attention to the 
five matters raised on page 37 of petitioners' brief. 
They first complain because they had no voice in the 
creating of a district. The cases cited above under the 
discussion of the effect of the legislative validation hold 
that the legislature could by legislative fiat create a 
district and fix its boundaries. They also hold that the 
legislature may delegate the right to create a district 
and that it is only when the district attempts to impose 
a tax or a lien against the property by way of a special 
assessment, that a hearing is required. In this case, 
the creation of the district was ratified and confirmed 
by the legislature, which would have had the power in 
the first instance to create it without notice or hearing, 
and the failure on the part of the residents to have a 
larger voice in the creation of the district has not de-
prived them of any constitutional right. The County 
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Commission, to whom the petition for creation of the 
district was presented, was duly elected by the people 
of the County, and Section 1 gave the County Commis-
sion discretion as to whether it would create a district, 
even if the requisite number of people petitioned for its 
creation. In all respects the statutes were followed in 
the creation of the district. If there were any irregulari-
ties (and none is pointed out by petitioners), those 
irregularities were cured by legislative validation. As 
to the right to have a voice in the creation of the district 
see, in addition to the cases cited under Point I, Seliah 
v. Hoskins, 222 U.S. 522; Little River Drainage, 236 Mo. 
94, 139 s.w. 330. 
The second complaint, to wit, that there was a 
criminal ordinance which required connection to the 
sewer, is adequately met by the square holding of the 
Supreme Court in Hutchinson v. Valdosta, supra. 
The third complaint that applicants were required 
to put a lien on their house or keep an eighteen months' 
advance deposit, is founded upon a mis-statement of fact. 
There were five, not two, methods of applying for service. 
Only one of the five provided for a lien if the bill became 
90 days delinquent. The lien was a matter of contract 
and did not involve the concept of due process. All of 
this has been set forth in detail above, and will not be 
repeated here. 
The fourth protest is that there was a $100.00 in-
crease in the connection fee for persons who did not 
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sign for 8t'rYice by a 8tated deadline. The $100.00 in-
crease, about which they so bitterly complain, was 
adopted for the purpose of protecting those who sign 
up for service at the beginning. If they are not given 
any protection, any individual with a vacant lot could 
refuse to make any contribution toward the initial cost 
of the sewer until some future date, when he elected to 
build a house. If at that time he could connect on to the 
system at exactly the same connection fee as was paid 
by the initial subscriber, he would receive the benefits 
of a system partially paid for by others. A subscriber 
initially connecting to the system would pay $150.00 
down and $3.00 a month for twenty years, before the 
system was paid for. A subscriber connecting ten years 
from now, if permitted to do so, would pay the same 
$150 .. 00 down, but would pay the $3.00 per month for 
only ten years. To avoid this the County Commission 
declared that it would periodically increase the amount 
of the connection charge, so that any individual coming 
in at a future date would be required to pay his share 
of the total cost. An initial subscriber would pay $150.00 
down and $3.00 a month for twenty years. Fifty cents 
of this $3.00 would be necessary for operation and main· 
tenance. The other $2.50 would go to pay the interest 
and principal on the bonds. Thus, during that twenty 
years this individual would pay on the bonds an addi-
tional $600.00, which together with his down payment 
would make the cost of the sewer to him $750.00. A 
person coming in ten years later would pay only for ten 
years and thus would pay only $300.00 on the bonds at 
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the $3.00 monthly payments. If his down payment were 
also fixed at $150.00, he would get the sewer for $450.00, 
instead of the $750.00 paid by the initial subscriber. By 
raising his connection fee, he can be required to carry 
his fair share. There is nothing arbitrary or capricious 
in such a plan, and Section 9 of the act expressly gives 
the district the power to fix tolls and charges and provide 
rules and regulations. 
The complaint then is made that the $100.00 increase 
coming at such an early date goes beyond what is neces-
sary to equalize the payments. This is true, but any 
individual who expects to build a house in the next two 
or three years will be induced to subscribe for service 
now if he can get it for $150.00 rather than wait two 
or three years if he knows that at that time the down 
payment will be $250.00. Thus, by having a substantial 
early increase in the amount of the connection fee, pros-
pective builders will be induced to sign for service now. 
The $100.00 increase has in fact had that effect, because 
over 1200 vacant lots have applied for service. This 
spreads the initial cost of the sewer over more people 
and reduces the total amount which ultimately will have 
to be paid by the initial subscribers. 
Tied to the complaint on the $100.00 increase is the 
assertion that early subscribers are required to build 
and pay for a system large enough to meet future growth. 
This again is a misstatement of the plan. As the new 
connections come in, they will, as noted above, carry 
their portion of the sewer cost, from an increased con-
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nection fee. Payments made by them will be used to 
pay the bonds off before maturity. Also, in anticipation 
of growth in the area, more bonds were made payable 
in the later years. The initial subscribers will pay off 
only a small portion ·of the bonds. Reference to Exhibit 
V, page 11, will show that only $25,000.00 in the bonds 
will become due in 1955 and 1956; $50,000.00 per year 
from 1957 to 1979; $100,000.00 a year from 1980 to 1981; 
$150,000.00 per year from 1982 to 1986 ; and $600,000.00 
the last year, 1987. This staggering of the bond rna turi-
ties was done for the sole purpose of freeing the initial 
subscriber from carrying the entire cost of a sewer 
system which was built large enough to meet the needs 
of an expanding population. 
Thus, the contention by petitioners that the initial 
subscribers are having to pay a disproportionate share 
of total costs is simply not true. The $100.00 increase 
has a legitimate and proper purpose in the bond pro-
ceedings. It does have the effect of inducing people to 
sign for service and start carrying their burden of the 
cost from the beginning, but if they elect to wait, they 
then will pay their fair share of total cost. Petitioners 
are inconsistent in complaining about the $100.00 in-
crease, while in the same breath complaining that vacant 
lot owners are not being brought in and early users are 
being required to pay a disproportionate share of the 
costs. Those connecting in subsequent years will be re-
quired to pay their fair share of the total cost. The 
increased connection fee will be used to pay the bonds 
ahead of maturity and relieve the burden from the initial 
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subscriber. The maturing dates set on the bonds throw 
the major portion of the cost on ''tail end'' when the 
expanded population is connected to the system. 
The last thing complained about on page 37 is that 
if the bills aren't paid, the culinary water will be shut 
off. The sewer district does not own nor control the 
water supply going to the residents of the sewer district. 
The most it can do is request cooperation of a water 
company in this regard; and this request could hardly 
render the proceedings void. 
The Commission Has Not Unlawfully Permitted the 
District to Exceed Its Debt Limit. 
Every case which has been presented to the Supreme 
Court in the entire history of the state on the question 
of debt limits for districts of this kind has resulted in a 
decision that these districts are not subject to the con-
stitutional debt limits. No case to the contrary is cited 
by petitioners. The cases holding that districts of this 
kind are not controlled by Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4 
of the Constitution are Lehi v. Meiling, supra; Tygesen 
v. Magna Water Company, supra, and Patterick v. Car--
bon Water Conservancy District, supra. 
The cases also all hold that the debt limits do not in 
any event apply to revenue bond financing, because a 
debt which is payable entirely from the revenues of a 
new project is not a debt within the meaning of the 
section, even if this district were a political subdivision 
within the meaning of that provision. The argument as ta 
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the applicability of Section 19-10-1 falls in the same 
category. Petitioners' assertion that there is no sub-
stantial difference between revenue and assessment 
financing simply ignores the great body of law on that 
question. 
This court has on numerous occasions held that 
where projects are financed solely from revenues earned 
by the project, there is no necessity for an election on 
the bond issue, (Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 
supra), the indebtedness incurred is not a debt within 
the limitation of the constitutional prohibitions, and the 
requirements of due process as to notice and hearing 
which are required in assessment or tax cases do not 
apply. 
POINT IV: CHAPTER 6(a) IS NOT SO VAGUE, 
INDEFINITE, AMBIGUOUS, OR UNCERTAIN 
THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS NO'r 
DETERMINABLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE 
THE VALIDATION ACT CONFIRMS THE IN-
TERPRETATION PLACED UPON THE WORDS 
NOW CLAIMED TO BE CONFUSING. 
Petitioners contend Chapter 6(a) is so vague as to 
violate the Utah Constitution, Article V. No authority 
need be cited, certainly, for the general proposition that 
the Supreme Court must, where possible, uphold the 
validity of an act, rather than declare it unconstitutional. 
With specific reference to the objection of vagueness, 
this Court has said, in Tygesen v. Magn.a Water Com-
pany, supra: 
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''It is the duty of courts to interpret and construe 
statutes, and only where the statute is so vague 
that the meaning of the legislature cannot be 
ascertained or understood therefrom will they 
refuse to enforce an act. They will not substitute 
what they think ought to be the law -for ambigu-
ous terms in the act, nor will they declare an Act 
invalid because it has not been expressed as aptly 
or clearly as it could have been had different terms 
been used. Instead the courts will use every 
authorized means to discover and give an Act 
intelligible meaning. Only when it is impossible 
to resolve the doubts will an Act be declared 
invalid for uncertainty or vagueness. See Nowers 
v. Oakden, 110 Utah 25, 169 Pac. 2d. 108." 
Plaintiff points to two terms of the act as uncertain, 
ambiguous or vague. The :first is the word ''people'' in 
the phrase '' 10% of the people must petition for the 
improvement" in Chapter 6(a), Section 1. Perhaps the 
exact legislative intent would be difficult to determine 
if no extra-statutory assistance were available, but such 
assistance is available. A petition was :filed with the 
commission, and its signatures were accepted by the 
commission on a definite criterion, according to the 
plaintiff (page 45 of brief). The legislature then vali-
dated the proceedings by which the district had been 
established. It thereby confirmed as the legislative intent 
the administrative interpretation placed upon the in-
culpated phrase. 
Petitioners next aver that they are not sure what 
is meant by "appropriate and possible under the law~ 
of the United States" in Section 8 of Chapter 6(a). Peti 
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tioners' first point was that the phrase could only refer 
to a particular federal act. \Ve do not agree that Section 
8 attempts to limit the district only to negotiations as 
provided by any federal act, but we admit having been 
swayed by petitioners' argument that part thereof quoted 
was inserted to call attention to a way of financing 
projects provided by a particular federal act. Even if 
the phrase is entirely ignored, however, the act is com-
plete and workable. 
At any rate, by using "every authorized and intel-
ligible means to discover and give (this) act intelligible 
meaning", it can easily be judicially interpreted without 
fear of offending the Utah Constitution. No other item 
as to vagueness is raised by petitioners. 
POINT V: CHAPTER 23(b) LAWS OF UTAH, 1947, 
IS NOT REPUGNANT TO ARTICLE VI, SEC-
TION 26, OR ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Petitioners' objection is that Chapter 6(a), Title 19, 
authorized the creation of many kinds of districts, but 
that Chapter 23(b) purported to cure defects in the or-
ganization of sewer districts only. Petitioners say 
Chapter 23(b) is, therefore, a special law, or that it 
creates a corporation for municipal purposes. 
Article VI, Section 26, prohibits the legislature from 
enacting any special laws in certain enumerated cases 
only. Petitioners apparently believe subsection 16, which 
prohibits special laws, "Granting to an individual, asso-
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ciation or corporation any privilege, immunity or fran-
chise,'' applies to the facts in this case. We submit that 
the Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District is not an 
individual, association or corporation. It is a political 
subdivision (Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy 
District, supra). Nor did Chapter 23(b) grant any fran-
chise, immunity or privilege. Even if it were true that 
Chapter 23(b) is a "special law" (which it is not) there-
fore, petitioners have not cited a constitutional prohibi-
tion which applies. There is no constitutional provision 
which prohibits the validation by a special law of pro-
ceedings under a general law. 
But Chapter 23(b) is not a special law. It is a statute 
general in terms purporting to validate the proceedings 
of any sewer district attempted to be created under 
Chapter 6 (a), Title 19. Petitioners say that the Salt 
Lake City Suburban Sewer District was the only one 
affected "as far as we know". An act general in terms 
is presumed to be general (Kennedy v. Meyer, 103 A. 44). 
The mere fact that only one entity is affected by a cura-
tive act is of no moment. Kennedy v. Meyer, supra, in-
volved a curative act validating any contract for the 
construction of a tunnel which any county had entered 
into. Only one county had entered into a contract for 
the construction of a tunnel. The court held the statute 
was a general statute. In McSurely v. McGrew, 18 N.W. 
415, the legalization of the acts of county supervisors in 
releasing the county treasurer from liability for loss 
54 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of funds deposited in a bank which failed was upheld. 
Only one treasurer was affected. 
The plain fact is, of course, that curative acts are 
not the evil the Constitutional Convention attacked in 
adopting the provision cited by petitioners. Remedial 
statutes are and long have been recognized legislative 
tools. To some extent, they are similar to special acts, 
in that they can only affect particular, existing persons, 
obligations or entities, and the exact ones affected can 
always be determined at the time the curative act is 
passed. But it is often stated flatly that such laws are 
not special. (Barnett v. State Mineral Board, 192 So. 701 
and cases previously cited.) If such acts had been ab-
horrent to the convention, they could have been pro-
hibited by name. 
So far as Article XI, Section 5, is concerned, it does 
not purport to apply to improvement districts, and it has 
been held by this Court not to apply to improvement 
districts. (Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservarn.cy Dis-
trict, supra.) 
In the Sixth Edition of Cooley's Treatis on the 
Constitutional Limitations, the question of remedial or 
retrospective laws is dealt with, and we quote the fol-
lowing from page 455 of Chapter 11 of that work: 
''There is no doubt of the right of the legislature 
to pass statutes which reach back to change or 
modify the effect of prior transactions provided 
retrospective laws are not forbidden eo nomine 
by the state constitution." 
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A typical case in which the principle has been recognized 
is Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 198 A. 746, 116 
A.L.R. 1031, wherein as shown by the syllabus, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut said: 
"Remedial statutes may be retrospective in opera-
tion provided they do not impair contracts or 
disturb absolute vested rights, but only to con-
firm rights already existing and in furtherance 
of the remedy, and by curing defects afford or 
add to the means of enforcing existing rights or 
obligations; and if the irregularity sought to be 
cured consists in a mode or manner of doing 
some act which the legislature might have made 
immaterial by prior law, it is equally competent 
to make the same immaterial by a subsequent 
law.'' 
Petitioners cite no cases in support of the notion 
that a validating act must validate all proceedings which 
have been attempted under a prior law if it is to validate 
any of them. They state no reason for such a restriction 
on legislative activity. There is none. 
POINT VI: THE EFFECT OF THE REPEALING 
RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 6, 1952, WAS AT 
LEAST TO RESTORE THE LAW AS IT WAS 
BEFORE THE ORDINANCE REPEALED BY 
THAT RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED. 
McQuillan, 3rd Edition, Section 21.42, cites cases 
from nine jurisdictions, including the United States 
(U. 8. v. Philbrook, 120 U.S. 52) in support of the fol-
lowing statement: 
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''A rule, supported by many cases and probably 
the common law rule, is that the repeal of a re-
pealing statute or ordinance restores the law, 
without formal words of reYiYal, as it was before 
the repealing statute or ordinance, unless it is 
otherwise provided in the enactment repealing 
the repealing statute or ordinance.'' 
There are no statutory or constitutional restrictions 
on the power so to revive a once existing legal situation. 
The resolution of October 6, 1952, clearly states the intent 
of the Commissioners to revive the legal situation which 
obtained before the resolution of April 5, 1948. The 
procedure by which repeal of the repealer was attempted 
(resolution) was of the same magnitude as the procedure 
(resolution) repealed and rescinded. The only possible 
conclusion under the cases is that the status of the Salt 
Lake City Suburban Sanitary District proceedings have 
been, at least since October 6, 1952, exactly what it was 
on April 4, 1948. 
The proceedings in connection with the sewer be-
tween April 5, 1948, and October 6, 1952, do not depend 
on any ordinance or resolution. The district, (which was 
an existing political entity) was not repealed by the 
resolution of April 5, 1948. It had express power to 
enter into contracts, as it did with an engineer, a fiscal 
agent and people in the district. That is all the district 
did. So far as the many hearings held and informative 
pamphlets distributed are concerned, they were just as 
informative and just as well attended and received as 
if the resolution of April 5, 1948, had never been passed. 
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W s submit that the only sensible way for district 
officers to operate is as the officers of the Salt Lake City 
Suburban Sanitary ,bistrict have in this case. 
1. A district is established, the object· of which is 
the installation of a sewer facility. This was done Sep-
tember 9, 1946, and no attempt has ever been made to 
dissolve, abandon or rescind this action. 
2. The governing authority contracted with an 
engineer to determine cost and feasibility. 
3. The governing authority contracted with a fiscal 
agent to devise the best and least burdensome way to 
finance the project. 
4. With a workable plan, they now go to the people; 
they schedule mass meetings, distribute pamphlets and 
explain a proposed plan. 
5. They ask the people to indicate their approval 
of the plan by their willingness by contract to subscribe 
for the services and pay for them as proposed. 
6. Now the governing authority can intelligently 
construct an ordinance with reference to a bond issue, 
knowing the project is feasible, how much it will cost 
and how many people can be relied upon initially to 
contribute to the revenues which are the pledge sup-
porting the bonds. 
The procedure was orderly and in the best legislative 
tradition, get the facts as accurately and completely as 
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possible, and then act on them. Statutes may require 
that the fact-finding process be one of hearing, protest, 
etc., but they needn't, and Chapter 6 (a) doesn't. 
Petitioners contend the contractual provisions of the 
subscription applications would not be effective unless 
the Commission formally approved them. Such action 
is necessary and the Commission can and will approve 
and accept these agreements. Petitioners suggest that 
some kind of formal action is necessary to indicate that 
a district intends to contract; that it has seen and under-
stands the provisions of a particular contract; that it 
is now entering into a contract, and that a contract 
entered into is now approved. This is just so much 
palover. The people have applied for service. The 
district will formally accept. 
We do not contend that Chapter 23(b), Laws of 
Utah, 1947, the curative act, has prospective effect. It is, 
however, legislative confirmation of the creation of the 
district and the initial bond proceedings. It also is a 
confirmation by the legislature of the administrative 
interpretation previously given Chapter 6(a), Title 19, 
by the Commission. So far as subsequent acts of the 
Commission with reference to the district have been 
consistent with that interpretation, therefore, they have 
statutory authorization invigorated by Chapter 23(b). 
Defendants do not rely on the validating act for author-
ity to make the amendments which petitioners detail on 
page 60 of their brief; they rely on Chapter 6 (a), Title 
19, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
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Particular attention is directed to the argument 
appearing in capital letters on page 62 of petitioners' 
brief. It is that the district officers can possibly do some-
thing illegal in the future. The usual rule is that a court 
will not consider such an argument, and that there will 
be time enough to enjoin or restrain such an act if, as 
and when it happens. In Wicks v. Salt Lake City, 208 
Pac. 538, this Court responded to such an argument : 
"Plaintiff does not contend that it manifestly 
appears that the act of 1921 attempts to authorize 
the creation of a debt in excess of the limit fixed 
by the Constitution, but the contention seems to 
be that there is a vague and remote possibility 
that a literal compliance with the law may at 
some time result in the creation of (such indebt-
edness. 
''To hold (an act) unconstitutional on some vague 
theory that in its operation there is the barest 
possibility of an infringement of the Constitution 
is going further than any case which has hereto-
fore come under my observation.'' 
See also the discussion by Mr. Justice Wolfe in 
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, supra, 
on the time set for the hearing. 
It is respectfully submitted that the plan is legal 
and reasonable and the writ of prohibition should be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
FRANK E. MOSS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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